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I reply to Hawthorne and Uzquiano’s () arguments for the incompatibility be-
tweenmereological universalismandplenitudinous co-location. I argue that amere-
ology in which antisymmetry for parthood fails is independently motivated, and
allows for both universalism and plenitudinous co-location. ere can be as many
angels in a place as there are cardinalities.
Supposing that angels can be located at a (zero-dimensional) point in space, and additionally
that they can be co-located, the question naturally arises: how many such things can be co-
located at a point in space? Where alephs are cardinals, here are two possible answers.
Indeĕnite Extensibility ere could not be so many angels as to exceed each and every aleph,
but for each ordinal a there could be at least @a-many angels located at a point.
Plenitude e could be at least as many angels as there are alephs.
Hawthorne and Uzquiano () object to  by showing that it is incompatible
with mereological universalism — the view that for every plurality xx, there exists of fusion of
xx. (ey also show how the weaker answer of   is incompatible with
Lewis’s () modal realism and Williamson’s () necessitism.) Instead of their argument
constituting a reductio against  (or against   for modal re-
alists/necessitists), one might rather conceive of it as a reductio of mereological universalism.
. If mereological universalism is true, then it is necessarily true.
. If mereological universalism is necessarily true, then  is false.
. But,  is true.
. So, mereological universalism is false.
One might reject () a la Cameron  and Parsons .Ƭ Or, one might reject () as appar-
ently do Hawthorne and Uzquiano. Finally, one might reject () and Hawthorne and Uzquiano’s
case for it. In this article I argue against () by claiming that the mereological universalist who
believes in co-location has a straightforward and independently-motivated reply.
. Videtur quod non
It would seem that there cannot be asmany angels as there are alephs. For consider the following
widely accepted principle connected to the philosophical conception of a set.
Limitation of Size A plurality forms a set iﬀ they are not in one-one correspondence with the
entire universe of all objects.
is principle entails that there is exactly one cardinality that is not characterised by the alephs,
and that is the size of the universe. To see why, note that (on pain of the Burali-Forti paradox)
the ordinals do not form a set. So, by    the ordinals must be in a one-one
correspondence with the entire universe. But since the aleph series can be put into a one-to-
one correspondence with the ordinals, we know that the size of the alephs is the only size not
characterised by them.
Say that a plurality xx is disperse iﬀ every sub-plurality yy among the xx has a distinct mereo-
logical fusion. We also can show, following Hawthorne and Uzquiano , p. -, by a gener-
alization of Cantor’s diagonal argument, that any non-singular plurality hasmore sub-pluralities
than members. What follows, then, is a particularmereological result:
Mereological Result if a non-singular plurality is disperse, there are more fusions of its sub-
pluralities that there are members of it.
Hawthorne andUzquiano’s (, p. ) argument is as follows: suppose we have a non-singular
disperse plurality. en it has more sub-pluralities than members. By mereological univer-
salism, every sub-plurality has a fusion. By disperseness, distinct sub-pluralities have distinct
fusions. us, it has more fusions of its sub-pluralities that it has members.
Notice that this mereological result rests crucially on the assumption of mereological uni-
versalism: once we assume that every sub-plurality of a disperse plurality has a fusion, then the
plurality has more fusions than members.
ƬAlthough, there are some costs to this approach. A mereological universalist who rejected () would need
to make apparently ad hoc restrictions on the contingency of composition: while it would be contingent whether
ĕnitelymany co-located objects composed, it would have to be necessary that inĕnitelymany co-located objects do
not compose, on pain of contradiction, as Hawthorne and Uzquiano show. (anks to an anonymous referee for
this point.)
At last, we come to the argument.
Our [mereological] result tells us that there are strictly more fusions of angels than
there are angels. Limitation of size tells us that the size of the [angels] is at most
the size of the alephs. […] Given Plenitude, we are forced to conclude that the size
of the angels matches the size of the actual alephs. But now, by our mereological
result, we must conclude that there are strictly more [fusions of angels] than there
are alephs, which contradicts limitation of size. (Hawthorne and Uzquiano, ,
p. -)
It would seem, then, that we cannot accept both  and mereological universalism.
. Sed contra
To the contrary, Hawthorne and Uzquiano suggest the possibility of a non-standard mereology,
when discussing their objection to Williamson’s necessitism:
Suppose we adopt a mereology that — as against classical extensional mereology
— abandons the presumption that parthood is antisymmetric […] It now becomes
possible to think of the possibly (but not actually) concrete objects, not as forming
a disperse plurality, but as parts of each other, forming an entangled unity. When
an object becomes concrete it breaks oﬀ from — that is, becomes mereologically
discrete from those entangled entities, and when it ceases to be concrete, it returns
to — that is, becomes mereologically reconciled to — those entities. While this is
not perhaps a full vindication of Plotinus’ doctrine of a return to the One— carried
into scholastic philosophy by the early Church Fathers — it is perhaps as close to a
vindication as sober analytic metaphysics can provide. (Hawthorne and Uzquiano,
, p. )
WhileWilliamson’s necessitism does utilise the concrete/abstract distinction in crucial and con-
troversial ways, he does nothing so far removed from sober analytic metaphysics as this. is
sort of failure of antisymmetry seems under-motivated, and so the rejection of standard mere-
ology seems here to be ad hoc.
. Respondeo dicendum
I reply saying that one does not have to appeal to any strange doctrines like the ‘return to theOne’
to defend mereological universalism. Indeed, the failure of antisymmetry is much better moti-
vated in the context of mereological universalism that allows for the possibility of co-location.
at is, there are independent reasons why co-located angels should be thought to constitute
counterexamples to antisymmetry.
To see this, we begin with a single binary primitive of mereological overlap  and the follow-
ing deĕnitions.ƭ
Parthood x  y B 8z(z  x ! z  y)
Proper Parthood x < y B x  y & y  x
Non-identical Parthood x  y B x  y & x 6= y
Fusions F(y, xx) B 8z(z  y $ z  xx)
In the deĕnition of fusion, we use ‘z  xx’ to mean that z overlaps some x among the xx.Ʈ
e deĕnition of parthood allows us to prove reĘexivity and transitivity of; but we do not
allow anti-symmetry ofwhich is equivalent to 8z((z  x $ z  y)! x = y), an extensionality
principle of overlap. us, we might have distinct objects a 6= b such that a  b and b  a. As
a consequence, we need to be clear about the relevant notion of proper part that we are using.
On one conception, x is a proper part of y whenever x is non-mutual part of y. By the deĕnition
of parthood in terms of overlap, we thus have that if x < y then there’s a z which overlaps x
but doesn’t overlap y. is is a form of weak supplementation. By contrast, there is another
conception of proper part — that of a non-identical part, expressed by ‘’ — according to which
we are not guaranteed supplementation.
In any case, we have two axioms of our mereology:
Axiom  8x8y(x  y $ 9z(z  x & z  y))
Axiom  8xx9y F(y, xx)
e ĕrst axiom is simply an intuitively obvious truth about overlap. e second axiom is tanta-
mount to mereological universalism.
But thismereology is very well-suited to allowing co-location. Indeed, it maywell be the only
co-locational mereology compatible with the following assumption about locations. Where an
object is weakly located at a region iﬀ the region is not completely free of it,
ƭNote that we are using  to correspond to mereological overlap — not mere spatial overlap. Alternatively, we
could have chosenmereological disjointness o as our primitive, since they are interdeĕnable as the negations of each
other.
Ʈese are fusions in the style of Goodman  and Simons , rather than the deĕnition of fusions used in
Tarski  and Lewis . Although this mereology could have been axiomatized using the Tarskian deĕnition,
too (see Cotnoir ).
Harmony if x is weakly located at every region in which y is weakly located, then anything that
overlaps x overlaps y.⁴
On this view, co-located objects x and y are mutual parts: x  y & y  x.⁵ By the deĕnition
of , this is equivalent to: 8z(z  x $ z  y); that is, two objects are co-located whenever they
overlap the same objects.
. Ad primum ergo dicendum
erefore to the ĕrst objection based on the   , we can see that on this mere-
ological conception of co-located xx and any xi among the xx, we have it that F(xi, xx); aer all,
for co-located xx, 8z(z  xi $ z  xx). In the case at hand, each individual angel counts as a fu-
sion of the angels. Hence according to our co-location mereology, the angels are not a disperse
plurality. So the    argument fails.⁶ We do need some assurance that the only
fusions of xx that exist are identical to some xi among the xx. In other words, we want to be sure
that the angels together with their fusions do not force there to be strictly more things than there
are alephs.
ere is, however, a straightforward way of showing why the number of fusions of angels is
just the same as the number of angels themselves. We merely need appeal to a single plausible
principle about locations of fusions:
Inheritance If y is the fusion of xx, then for all regions r, y is weakly located at r iﬀ some x among
xx is weakly located at r.
is principle entails that if none of the xx are located in a region, then neither is their fusion.
at is, a whole inherits the locations of its parts. We can then argue as follows. Let the xx be the
⁴Alternatively: the exact location of x is a subregion of the exact location of y iﬀ x  y— the harmony principle
called (r) in Uzquiano , p. .
⁵It might seem odd that on this view spatial coincidence would entail mereological overlap; why couldn’t two
distinct things occupy the same place without being mereologically related in any way? e view is considered (p.
) and eventually rejected (Ch. ) in Simons . I do not have the space to defend the view here, but here are
two preliminary reasons in favour of the view. e ĕrst is that  follows from a more general principle to
the eﬀect that the exact location of a fusion is inherited from the exact locations of its parts (see Uzquiano ,
p. , and Fn. ). A second reason is that it allows for a purely spatial approach to mereology in the sense of
Markosian . In other words, accepting this harmony principle would allow a reduction of mereology to purely
topological predicates and relations (see Casati and Varzi , Sect. .) without requiring that co-located objects
are identical.
⁶One might object that while this response preserves the letter of mereological universalism, it gives up the
spirit of universalism since the fusion of co-located objects need not be some further thing. Just what counts as
mereological universalism is somewhat less clear in the context where co-location is allowed, and indeed is made
more complicated by a non-extensional mereological theory as required here. For more discussion showing that a
related view satisĕes every possible plausible deĕnition of universalism, see Cotnoir .
plurality of all things exactly located at a point r.⁷ By   , the xx can be at most
as many as the alephs. Now, let F(y, xx). Since fusions are upper bounds of the things fused, xx
are all parts of y. Hence, by , y is weakly located at r and only r; that is, y is exactly
located at r. Hence y is one of the xx. As a result we can rest assured that the cardinality of angels
does not exceed the cardinality of the alephs.⁸
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